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Background and Motivation 
 
At a recent symposium delivered to representatives from a wide range of not-for-
profit financial literacy training organizations, the topic “Selecting the Right 
Strategic Partners” was presented.  The symposium, Nonprofit Marketing and 
Distribution Strategies for Investor Education, held in Hanover, New Hampshire, 
during May 2007, was sponsored by the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD) Investor Education Foundation to encourage activities that 
provide financial literacy training across all demographics. 
 
A quasi-analytical approach to selecting a strategic partner was presented, which 
purported to identify potential strategic partnerships which would be valuable to 
both parties.  A fundamental proposition was that strong partnerships will only 
succeed if benefits to the partnership accrue to both parties.   
 
For example, suppose organization A is considering two potential strategic 
partners: SP1 and SP2.  Under the presented approach, A will want to “calculate” 
the: 
 
 Value OF each strategic partner; and 
 Value TO each strategic partner 
 
The calculation will depend upon the strategic goals of A, SP1 and SP2; 
weightings measuring the relative importance of goals (arbitrarily set to total 100 
points for each organization); and ratings measuring the extent to which a 
strategic partner would be helpful in meeting goals (arbitrarily chosen with scores 
between 1 (not helpful) to 10 (extremely helpful)).  To illustrate application of 
this approach, the symposium facilitator provided Table 1 to calculate the value 
OF SP1 and SP2 to A. 
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TABLE 1 
 
 
 
 
Source: Nonprofit Marketing and Distribution Strategies for Investor Education: 
A Symposium, sponsored by the NASD Investor Education Foundation at Tuck 
Executive Education at Dartmouth, May 7-9, 2007 
 
 
In this case, A has identified five key goals ranging from “Targeting new 
audiences” to “Increasing diversity”.  Weights, capturing the relative importance 
of the goals are attributed to each goal by A.  Finally, based on comprehensive 
discussions between A and SP1 and A and SP2, ratings are assigned to both SP1 
and SP2 for each of A’s goals.  These ratings measure how helpful SP1 and SP2, 
respectively, would be in working jointly with A to promote A’s goals.  Using this 
data, a “score” is calculated for both SP1 and SP2 by summing the product of 
rating and weights for each of A’s five goals.  Under this model, the higher the 
score, the more desirable the strategic partner will be to A.   
 
At the same time, using a similar rubric, A will also want to evaluate its value as a 
strategic partner TO both SP1 and SP2.  The facilitator provided companion Table 
2. 
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TABLE 2 
 
 
 
 
Source: Nonprofit Marketing and Distribution Strategies for Investor Education: 
A Symposium, sponsored by the NASD Investor Education Foundation at Tuck 
Executive Education at Dartmouth, May 7-9, 2007 
 
 
Ideally, working closely with SP1 and SP2, A identifies the key goals for SP1 and 
SP2.  To make the exposition less cluttered, Table 2 assumes that SP1 and SP2 
have the same set of goals and weightings.  If this were not the case, A would 
simply prepare a separate Table 2 for SP1 and SP2.  In Table 2, ratings measure 
the extent to which each potential partner believes that A will help them meet 
their goals (A clearly may not have full and accurate information).  Final 
numerical scores are then calculated for SP1 and SP2.  The higher the numerical 
score, the more helpful the potential partners believe, in A’s opinion, that A will 
be in assisting to promote the partner’s goals. 
 
In choosing a strategic partner, A will look at (Value OF,Value TO) ordered pairs, 
hoping to find an ordered pair with high scores in both dimensions.  In our 
example, the ordered pairs are: 
 
(A,SP1)  :  (690,749) 
 
(A,SP2)  :  (320,230) 
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Ultimately, A must make a qualitative judgment as to which ordered pair is 
optimal.  In our given example, it would be intuitive to judge that the (A,SP1) 
choice dominated (A,SP2) since (A,SP1) is numerically higher in both 
dimensions.  In actual practice, especially when evaluating more that two 
potential partner candidates, it is likely that no dominant ordered pair will obtain.  
In such cases, A is left to perform an (undefined) calculus to select a partner or 
partners to pursue. 
 
While it could be productive to evaluate the arbitrary nature of the model 
specification and functional form, we will consider a practical aspect in the 
implementation of the procedure that came to light during exercises at the NASD 
symposium.  The exercises asked representatives from the various investor 
organizations present to work with colleagues in other organizations to build 
“Value OF the strategic partner” and “Value TO the strategic partner” tables to 
determine if partnerships could be viable.  At the end of the exercise session, 
results were presented to the symposium. 
 
A stunning result was that in the vast majority of cases, potential partners 
recommended that steps be undertaken to consummate collaboration.  In some 
cases, the potential partners reported high ordered pairs, and exhibited a strong 
desire to collaborate consistent with the intent of the model.  In some other cases, 
the ordered pair scores were relatively low, but the potential partners worked to 
identify some subset of respective goals on which they could collaborate.  So 
while high total scores had not obtained, “high enough” scores on selected criteria 
justified next steps towards collaboration.  How about cases in which the ordered 
pair scores were low and there were no meaningful matches even on individual 
criteria?  Surprisingly, many of the candidate partners decided to proceed together 
even in these cases.  Justifications to proceed in these cases ranged from “strong 
interpersonal matches between principals in our organizations” to “a collaboration 
will be a low cost strategy, so let’s try it”.  Clearly, these explanations violate the 
spirit of the Value OF/Value TO model.  Furthermore, while “strong interpersonal 
matches between principals in our organizations” could well be a necessary 
condition for a successful collaboration, it is by no means a sufficient condition.  
In particular, per the model, compatibility of the goals is required.  Regarding 
“collaboration will be a low cost strategy, so let’s try it”, it is a common error to 
underestimate costs in project accounting. 
 
The fascinating point here is that a very high proportion of potential strategic 
partner pairs “found” a way to work together either via direct application of the 
model or via extra-model approaches.  However, ex ante it would seem 
reasonable to expect that it is not optimal for almost all potential partnerships to 
be viable. 
 
The purpose of this paper will be to explore these partnering opportunities using 
an economic value maximizing approach.  The modeling environment will be 
illustrated using the symposium example from Tables 1 and 2.  The model will 
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take the numerical ordered pairs as Bayesian estimates for potential partnership 
benefits.  These estimates will then be combined with partners’ monetary 
constraints and valuation functions to select optimal levels of collaboration.   
 
While in our illustrations A will often choose to work with both SP1 and SP2, the 
model additionally presents the optimal level of monetary participation in each 
partnership alliance.  Further, reasonable functional forms could be specified in 
which the model would find a “corner solution”, namely, the commitment of all 
available partnership funds to one superior partner, thereby explicitly eliminating 
collaboration with the second potential partner.  Future research will address this 
issue in the n-partner case, wherein it would be expected that a corner solution 
(namely, the allocation of available partnership funds to a subset of the available 
partners) would be quite common. 
 
Brief Literature Review 
 
Recent research on strategic partner selection has ranged from the conceptual to 
the analytically sublime.  As an example of the former, Dubow (2006) posits ten 
steps for evaluating and selecting a strategic partner.  Dubow lists common sense 
strategies that managers of healthcare organizations could use, including: 
 
 Identify imperatives for partnering 
 Set criteria for evaluating potential partners 
 Complete a detailed assessment and prioritize potential partners 
 Close the deal 
 
It would be difficult to argue against these recommendations, and they are in fact 
quite consistent with the approach presented at the NASD symposium.  Our intent 
here is to remain true to the precepts in the Dubow and symposium approaches, 
but to make them more analytical in application. 
 
A “sublime” approach to the issue can be found in Ding and Liang (2005).  
Herein, the authors employ fuzzy set theory and fuzzy multiple criteria decision 
making to evaluate viable strategic alliances in the shipping industry.  While this 
approach sensibly emphasizes the imprecise nature of goals, partnership 
expectations, etc., it remains to be seen if the “fuzzy set theory employed a 
practical model for business purpose (sic)”.   It is obvious that the modeling 
environment is quite elegant, but there exists considerable literature putting in 
doubt whether highly complex approaches will be adopted by managers as a 
preferred model.  For example, Fehr and Bristol (2006) provide a description of 
the failure of three complex financial models to be implemented. 
 
There is also recognition in the literature that financial cost associated with a 
potential collaboration and the monetary constraints of the partners are crucial.  
Chang (2006), in the context of a chief learning officer needing to choose a 
strategic partner or vendor to provide external learning resources, reports that 
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“finding and contracting can be a time consuming and costly process”.  Our 
approach is to explicitly include monetary constraints in the analytical model.  
Note that financial constraints/conditions were not considered explicitly by the 
NASD symposium model in the first stages of partnering evaluation.  The 
presumption was that monetary issues would be addressed in any Memorandum 
of Understanding between the parties.  An economics driven approach will prefer 
to make financial considerations a key endogenous element of decision making 
from the start. 
 
It is also the case that, for the purposes of this paper, the problem has been 
narrowed down to explore a methodology for selection of an optimal partner(s) 
from a list of potential candidates.  Of course, the range of issues is significantly 
larger.  For example, where does the list of potential partners come from?  How 
are candidate strategic partners identified?  Buksbaum (1999) suggests that 
approaches could include exploitation of media opportunities and using high 
profile events that not only guarantee credibility, but also participation by many 
organizations.  We would submit that the NASD symposium was such an event.  
 
 In another vein, behavioral economists would likely be interested in the 
symposium phenomenon which had virtually every organization proposing to 
work together under some format.  For example, is rational evaluation being 
trumped by a more fundamental desire to be complementary and accommodating 
even when business considerations might suggest otherwise; see Thaler and 
Shefrin (1981) for the foundations of behavioral economics. 
 
Two Potential Partner Model 
 
Let us consider A’s evaluation of potential strategic partners SP1 and SP2 relying 
on the data in Tables 1 and 2.  Define 
 
    W0 = total amount of funding that A will be able to commit to partnership 
activities 
 
    D1 = dollars to be committed to partner SP1 
 
    D2  = dollars to be committed to partner SP2 
 
 
where D1, D2  ≥ 0.                    . 
 
A will want to optimally allocate W0 between D1 and D2.  A will do so by using 
the ordered pairs generated from the Tables coupled with functions that measure 
“value” to A and the amount of funding to be applied to partnership activities.  
The general case solution will be presented, along with an illustration using a 
quadratic valuation function. 
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Let 
 
   M1 = value OF strategic partner SP1 to A, e.g., 690 from Table 1 
 
    P1 = value TO strategic partner SP1 in working with A, e.g., 749 from Table 2 
 
    M2 = value OF strategic partner SP2 to A, e.g., 320 from Table 1 
 
    P2 = value TO strategic partner SP1 in working with A, e.g., 320 from Table 2 
M1, P1, M2 and P2 can be thought of as Bayesian priors on the viability of potential 
partnerships.  The actual value of the partnerships will also be functionally 
dependent upon the funding applied to any partnership.  The valuation function 
considered will be of the form (f will denote the function for the potential SP1 
partnership and a similar function g for the SP2 partnership) 
 
f(D1, M1, P1) 
where 
0
0
0
1
1
1
P
f
M
f
D
f
 
 
The first positive partial derivative above guarantees that the value of any 
partnership will be increasing in funds applied, given scores M1 and P1.  It is also 
reasonable to require that the valuation function be increasing in M1 since M1 
measures A’s prior of the value of the partner to A, before considering any 
funding.  Further, as argued previously, the value to A is increasing in P1, since 
any partner will have a greater incentive to make the partnership work, the larger 
is the value of the partnership to it.  Also, 
0
2
1
2
1
D
f
 
That is, the valuation function is posited to be concave downward so as to 
introduce decreasing scale returns, consistent with the usual economic assumption 
for production-like functions. 
 
In general, A’s problem is 
 
      MAX            ),,(),,( 222111 PMDgPMDf  
 
       s.t.                             
0, 21
021
DD
WDD
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A will maximize the total valuation score to working with both SP1 and SP2 
subject to a budget constraint and non-negativity constraints on funds to be 
invested; decision variables are D1 and D2. 
 
Form the lagrangian 
 
)(),,(),,( 021222111 WDDPMDgPMDf  
 
where λ is the lagrangian multiplier. 
 
First order conditions are 
 
:
1D
     01f  
:
2D
     01g  
:        021 WDD  
 
where f1 and g1 represent partial derivatives with respect to the first argument. 
 
So optimal D1
*
 and D2
*
are chosen so that 
 
),,(),,( 22
*
2111
*
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0
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2
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Now consider using the Tables 1 and 2 data in conjunction with quadratic 
valuation functions. 
 
Define 
 
2
11111
2
),,( D
b
DPMDf               
b
D
1
0 1  
                      222222
2
),,( D
c
DPMDg               
c
D
1
0 2  
 
where the inequality restrictions on D1 and D2 insure that  0
1D
f
  and 0
2D
g
.      
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To incorporate Table 1 and 2 data, let 
     
11
1
PM
b             1  
22
1
PM
c             1 
 
The functional forms for b and c insure that 0,0,0
211 M
g
P
f
M
f
 and 
0
2P
g
                                                                                                   
The exponential terms  and  allow additional generality in specifying the 
importance of M relative to P.  For example, with 1and >1, M scores are 
deemed to be more important than P scores. 
 
First order conditions are 
 
22
*
2
11
*
1 11
PM
D
PM
D
 
 
0
*
2
*
1 WDD  
 
Solving these linear equations 
]1[
1122
22
0
*
1
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][
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Numerical Results – Quadratic Valuation Function 
 
Table 3 presents calculated value for D1
* 
and D2
*
 working with quadratic 
valuation functions and Tables 1 and 2 data.  Recall from the Tables that 
 
M1 = 690 
 
P1 = 749 
 
M2 = 320 
 
P2 = 230 
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W0 is arbitrarily set at 100.  Table 3 could easily be modified for different W0 
since the quadratic function first order conditions are proportional to W0. 
 
TABLE 3 
 
Scenario # α β D1
* 
D2
*
 
1 1 1 $87.53 $12.47 
2 1.1 1 93.10 6.90 
3 1.5 1 99.46 0.54 
4 1 1.1 79.77 20.23 
5 1 1.5 28.19 71.81 
6 1.1 1.1 88.35 11.65 
 
 
Scenario #1 can be thought of as a base case in which the relative importance of 
M and P are the same.  Not surprisingly, given that M1 and P1 are significantly 
larger than M2 and P2, most of A’s available partnership monies are committed to 
SP1.  Scenario #2 depicts a functional form for SP1 wherein the M1 score is 
intensified, i.e., α>1, leading to more funding being applied to SP1. 
 
Scenario #3 exaggerates the scenario #2 effect, essentially eliminating A’s desire 
to partner with SP2.  So even in the two partner case, it is not necessary to posit 
“exotic” valuation functions to produce optimal solutions contrary to the NASD 
symposium result that virtually all potential partners wanted to work together.  
Intuition would suggest that, in an n-partner environment, corner solutions 
eliminating some potential partners would be even more common. 
 
Scenario #4 shows the sensible result that even the weaker potential partner based 
on the Bayesian priors can garner a larger share (relative to the base case) of A’s 
partnering funds if SP2’s valuation function is more intense.  However, because 
of the high Bayesian scores for SP1, it would be more difficult to present cases in 
which all of A’s funding would be applied to SP2 (compare scenario #5 with 
scenario #3). 
 
Scenario #6 presents the case in which the intensities of both M1 and M2 are 
increased. 
 
Summary 
 
The purpose of this paper was to react to a counter intuitive economic result 
observed at a recent practitioner symposium for financial literacy training 
organizations.  When given an opportunity to select peers as potential 
collaborators, virtually all such organizations “found” a way to partner with 
almost all potential candidates.  It is difficult to imagine, especially in an 
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environment with constrained funding available, that this result would obtain if 
potential partners are making optimal decisions. 
 
Firstly, this paper structures partners’ decision making within the framework of 
standard economic valuation maximization subject to a budget constraint.  For the 
two partner case, optimality conditions for both the general formulation and a 
numerical illustration are presented. 
 
Secondly, the paper sets the stage for future research to explore the counter 
intuitive result that has virtually all potential partners working together.  It is 
expected that, in the n-partner case with a realistic range of Bayesian priors, the 
optimization approach will find a corner solution in which some subset of 
potential partners receives no funding.  To support this claim, it is shown in 
Scenario #3 that the two partner numerical example could be specified to 
effectively eliminate one potential partner. 
 
It is the case in this paper that the valuation functions f and g are left largely 
unspecified.  If the proposed maximization procedure is to become operational, 
valuation functions must be specified (the quadratic case was simply meant as an 
illustration).  Further research will explore what analogies can be drawn to other 
production function applications. 
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